In Uncertainty and Structure as Psychological Concepts (1 962), Gamer introduced the idea of psychological redundancy as the size of an inferred subset by comparing two sequences, each of which consists of five Xs
If these symbols represented tosses of a fair coin, with X standing for heads and 0 standing for tails, each of these sequences of events would be equally likely to occur at random, with a probability of 2-l'. So says the statistician, who assumes the coin to be fair and pays attention to the process generating the sequences. But, according to Gamer, "any but the most perverse subject would say . . . that the first pattern was more regular, more meaningful, and even more redundant than the second" (1962, p. 202) . This is because when people are asked to compare two such sequences, their attention is not drawn to the generating mechanism but to the surface characteristics, to the way they might dictate each sequence to a secretary. The first sequence could be described as "OX repeated five times." The second is much harder to describe: "an X followed by three os, and X, an 0, two Xs, an 0 , and an x."
When people say that the first sequence is more regular, meaningful, and redundant than the second, they are not thinking of the set of 1,024 equiprobable patterns envisaged by the statistician, but of the small subset of patterns that might be dictated in almost the same way. The first sequence has a Siamese twin: "X 0 repeated five times." The second sequence is related to a vast tribe of equally unruly relatives: the sequence read back to front, the Xs and 0 s interchanged, the first half interchanged with the second, and so on. The smaller the subset people tend to infer from the description of a sequence, the greater the regularity, the meaningfulness, and the redundancy they ascribe to it.
Apparent disorder and randomness might be expected to be the converse of apparent regularity, meaningfulness, and redundancy. That is, one might think that the less regularity people find in a sequence, the more likely they are to consider it random. But Kahneman and Tversky (1972) showed that this hypothesis is only partly correct. It is true that subjects estimate the number of families in which the exact order of buths of boys and girls was BBBGGG to be significantly lower than the number of families in which the order of births was GBBGBG. However, apparent disorder is not sufficient to get subjects to label a sequence random; the sequence must also reflect "salient features of the process by which it is generated" (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, p. 430) . Laymen insist that even a short random sequence must contain about the same number of Xs and 0s; to ensure rough equality of frequency, they believe that there must be fewer long runs of Xs or Os, that is, more frequent alternations between Xs and Os, than expected in Bernoulli trials. This is the gambler's fallacy. But the logic behind this fallacy is not all that different from correct probabilistic reasoning, which also requires that the sequence reflect features of the generating process. The difference is in the choice of features. According to probability theory, all sequences ofevenfs, all sequences of Xs and Os, regardless of length, are equally probable in equiprobable Bernoulli trials. Laymen, to the contrary, view chance "as a self-correcting process in which a deviation in one direction induces a deviation in the opposite direction to restore the equilibrium. In fact, deviations are not 'corrected' as a chance process unfolds, they are merely diluted" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 , p. 1125 . Thus, they believe that all events must be equally frequent in all sequences of XS and os, whatever their length. Because this belief is a better approximation to the truth for longer sequences (the Law of Large Numbers), and because laymen do not know that their belief is true only for infinitely long sequences, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) called this common fallacy the Law of Small Numbers W N ) .
Taken together, LSN and the requirement that sequences avoid conspicuous patterns instantiate Kahneman and Tversky's (1 972) representativeness heuristic as applied to random sequences. All random sequences must be representative of the two fundamental properties of the generating process (as laymen understand it): equiprobability and disorder.
It has been argued that the representativeness heuristic has "little predictive value" (Wallsten, 1980, p. 219) , or that it "is but a redescription of the phenomenon" being explained (Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987, p. 155) . Indeed, one has to think through the implications of the representativeness heuristic afresh for each new probabilistic judgment, inference, or production task it explains. For instance, the representativeness heuristic as applied to understanding the gambler's fallacy takes on a different form when it is applied to the phenomenon of baserate neglect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971 , 1974 , 1982 . These different forms depend strongly on analyses of the subject's understanding of the task and on an analysis of subtle effects of verbal framing that may affect the subject's interpretation of the situation.
Whatever the level of generality of the concept of representativeness, in the case of binary random sequences, which concern us here, the representativeness heuristic has been made satisfactorily specific. Indeed, the representativeness heuristic has testable implications: If we ask subjects to simulate Bernoulli trials, we expect them to equalize the frequencies of the two event types in short subsequences, and to avoid conspicuous patterns in short subsequences of responses.
THE EXPERIMENT
We handed out test answer sheets designed for multiple-choice and true-false tests to students in a large Introduction to Psychology class. There were 240 items on the sheet, organized in six columns of 40 items (see Figure 1) . The students were asked to fill in circles A or B according to whether they had imagined the coin to have come up heads or tails. After the participants had all produced 240 responses, they were asked to write on their answer sheet whether they had filled in their responses in order or haphazardly. The following analysis is based on the 126 subjects whose responses were entered in order and who had produced 240 computer-readable responses.
Our subjects produced 240 = u + v binary symbols e l , . . . , e240, where u stands for the number of 0s and v stands for the number of 1s.
T F Figure I . The first two items on the Test Answer Sheet.
Preliminary Analyses
Before proceeding with the main analysis, we performed two preliminary analyses:
Equiprobability
First, u = v? Not quite. The 95% confidence interval for the proportions had a lower limit of .490 and an upper limit of ,498.
Station arity
Second, are the time series generated by the subjects stationary? To answer this question, we tested two hypotheses regarding stationarity. Hypothesis 1 was that the proportion of runs of length 1 did not differ in the first and second halves of the runs. These proportions of runs of length 1 were 53.60% and 55.04% for the first and second halves, respectively. Two parametric tests did not reject the hypothesis. The difference was not significant either by t tests for paired samples on the proportions ( t i 2 7 = 1.82, ns) or on their folded logs (Tukey, 1977, p. 670 ; t i 2 7 = 1.52, ns). One re-expression of the data did yield a significant difference: the folded root (Tukey, 1977, p. 670 ; t I 2 , = 1.99, p 5 ,0477). This is, however, a small effect: It explains 14% of the variance. Because the histograms of the differences between proportions and their re-expressions showed notable deviations from normality, we performed two distributionfree tests, and both rejected the hypothesis: Wilcoxon's signed rank test (large sample approximation), T* = 2.31, p I .0104, and Fisher's sign test (large sample approximation), B* = 2.21, p 5 .0136.
Hypothesis 2 was that the distribution of runs longer than 1 did not differ between the first and second half of each subject's data. We calculated two sets of observations: the lengths of runs in the first half of the data and the lengths of runs for the second half of the data of each subject. We performed a KolmogorovSmirnov test on the data of our 128 subjects to determine whether both samples were drawn from the same population. We rejected the hypothesis (a = .05) for
The sequence: Generating the k-tuple frequency tables. At the top of the table is a hypothetical subject's sequence. In each box are the length of the k-tuple (on the left in bold numbers) and successive k-tuple tokens, drawn from the sequence at the top, whose frequency is to be tallied (on the right, in staggered rows).
only one of our subjects, whereas we had expected to observe significant outcomes (5% of 128) for 6 or 7 subjects by chance.
Although the tests of the first hypothesis present a mixed picture, our analyses are favorable overall to the conclusion that the first and the second halves of the data are equivalent and that the time series is therefore stationary.
Type Counts
We arbitrarily divided the 124 subjects into two groups of 62. We then considered each subject's data as a series of overlapping k-tuple tokens (see Figure  2 ). In the case of 4-tuples, responses e i e i + l e i + 2 e i + 3 form the ith token, and responses e i + l e i + 2 e i + 3 e i + 4 form the (i + 1)th token. Each 4-tuple represents one of Z4 = 16 types (e.g., 0000,0001, 0010, 001 1, . . . , 11 11). We formed Table 1 ) and obtained k-tuple type counts for subject groups g = 1 , 2, for k-tuple lengths k = 4, . . . , 1 1 , and k-tuple types t = 0, . . . , 2k -1 . The data for each subject give us 240
-k + 1 k-tuples, for a total of 62 X (240 -k + 1 ) k-tuples per group. If the process generating the data were Bernoulli, we would expect 62 x (240 -k + 1)/2k tokens for each type. For the amount of data we collected, the practical upper bound on the value of k is 1 1 because when k = 1 1 , the expected count of tokens per type of 11-tuple is only 6.96. We did not use k = 2 or 3 because we know from analyses not presented here that such short sequences do not determine subjects' responses. From this point on, our dependent variables will be 16 (2 groups x 8 types) type-count tables (each 2k long). Each group of subjects gives us tables for k = 4, . . . , 1 1 (see a graphic representation for the two groups, with k = 10, in Figure 3 ). Each such table allows us to obtain a count of basic counts (Tukey, 1977, p. 550) or a discrete frequency distribution (Hoaglin & Tukey, 1985) : We count how many types were generated with a basic count of one, two, . . . , up to the basic count of the most often chosen type(s). We observed that all of these discrete frequency distributions are skewed downward (shown on the left side of Figure 4 ). Because the square root approximately stabilizes the variance of a Poisson random variable (Emerson, 1983, Section 8G) or of a binomial random variable when n is large and np is small (as may happen in a frequency distribution), we transform our distribution by using the square roots of the type counts instead of just type counts. As expected, the discrete frequency distribution of the square roots of the type counts for k = 11 is symmetric (right side of Figure 4) ; it is also well approximated by a Gaussian distribution ( Figure 5 ). Therefore all analyses were done on the square root of type counts.
Main Analysis
We have one goal: to determine how the representativeness heuristic manifests itself in the subjects' patterns of responding.
Type Features: Their Two Classes
Each of the 2k k-tuple types for k = 4, . . . , 11 can be characterized by five features:
1. Imbalance: l(k/2) -uI, where k is the length of the k-tuple, and u is 2 . Longest run (e.g., for 0010001, longest run = 3). 3. Alternations (e.lg., for 0010001, alternations = 3). 4. Palindrome (e.g., for 001 100 and 0010100, palindrome = 1). 5. Periodicity (e.g., for 01 101 101 1, the subpattern 01 1 is repeated three the number of 0s (e.g., for 0001000, imbalance = 2.5).
times, so periodicity = 3).
We grouped these features into two classes. The first three features are LSN features: A subject who uses the LSN part of the representativeness heuristic will avoid generating patterns with a high imbalance, a long run, or too many alternations. The two remaining features are pattern features: A subject who avoids conspicuous patterns will avoid generating palindromes or periodic patterns.
The Heart of the Analysis
To establish the relative importance of the two classes, for each k we regressed the square roots of the type counts separately on the LSN features and the pattern features to determine which explains a greater percentage of the variability of the square roots of the type counts.
Because the two classes of independent variables are not of equal size, we used cross-validation to make a parameter-free comparison. In other words, we tried to circumvent the problem that would arise if the three LSN independent variables were to predict the dependent variable better than the two pattern independent variables had: Did the LSN variables predict better because they are more numerous? For each value of k, we performed the regression for each group and obtained the predicted square roots of the type counts. Then, as a parameterfree comparison of the effectiveness of the two classes of features, we regressed the observed square roots of the type counts for one group on the predicted square roots of the type counts derived from the other. The percentage variability explained by these two regressions for each k must be adjusted for the following reason: The cross-validated values of R2 in question are bounded by the reliability of the data being explained-the percentage variability in the observed square roots of the type counts in one group explained by their variation in the other (see Figure 6 ) , which we call the percentage of explainable variability. That is why it is relative to this upper bound that we calculate the "percentage explainable variability explained" shown in Figure 7 .
From Figure 7 , it is clear that the pattern features explain essentially none of the variability beyond 4-tuples, whereas the LSN features do well throughout the range of k-tuples. In an analysis too extensive to be presented in this chapter, we showed that subjects are probably not considering k-tuples shorter than 5 or longer than 7. Hence, LSN features are essentially in complete control of the subjects' behavior, accounting for 80-90% of the available variance.
Discussion
In the generation of random sequences, people evidently pay little attention to the figural redundancies of the patterns they are generating. Sequences that were redundant by virtue of containing the repetition of a subsequence or by containing a mirror symmetry were not avoided. On the other hand, people attend to the numerical properties of sequence counts: length of longest run, number of alternations, and imbalance between head and tail count. These results are in apparent conflict with the notion that figural symmetries are not perceived to be the output of a random process. The exclusive control exercised over the numerical properties of the sequence counts may stem from the task imposed on the subject: the generation of a random sequence. Consider subjects who weigh the responses they have generated when they choose their current response (i.e., they open a window on their recent responses). Analyses that we have performed suggest that this window comprises between four and nine responses. The subjects' ability to control patterning of the responses depends on how they use this window. If subjects look at a range of windows rather than a window of a fixed size, they will find it difficult to remove patterning from all window sizes simultaneously. In numerical studies, we found that palindromes of length 4 to l l could not be removed simultaneously from a sequence of Bernoulli trials. Repeating subsequences could be expunged from Bernoulli trials, but all algorithms explored required several passes through the sequence. Thus, pattern symmetries are not controlled because they cannot be removed in the range of window sizes subjects use to determine future responses.
The constraints imposed by simultaneous window sizes do not pertain to the numerical (LSN) properties of sequences. Sequences that alternate often on small scales will also alternate often on large scales. Similarly, if the imbalance between heads and tails is moderated in small windows, it will also be moderated in large windows (although the converse is not true). But subjects do not always use small windows to control the numerical properties of sequences. For example, runs of length 4 are common. We do not have a theory of how subjects generate percentage 6o of explainable 125 80 sequences, but it appears that they use windows of fluctuating size as they generate new responses.
The issue of window size and the problems associated with the simultaneous satisfaction of a given criterion on a range of scales does not exist in the stimuli used by Gamer or by Kahneman and Tversky discussed at the beginning of this chapter. The stimuli they used were fixed in length, and their length was small. Given a string representing birth order, BBBGGG, subjects cannot analyze its symmetries on a range of scales. The natural scale of the stimulus is compelling, and an analysis of the pattern's symmetries is readily achieved.
It is not hard to understand why subjects generating sequences such as ours do not avoid subsequence repetition and symmetry. Consider the following sequence:
Although this sequence contains many symmetric subsequences, they are not salient. Here are some of them, indicated in boldface:
B B B G G G B B G B G G G B B B G G G G B B B B B B , BBBGGGBBGBGGGBBBGGGGBBBBBB, BBBGGGBBGBGGGBBBGGGGBBBBBB, BBBGGGBBGBGGGBBBGGGGBBBBBB.
We believe that subjects do not avoid symmetries in the generation of random sequences because they are not salient. The symmetry of a five-element string embedded in a long sequence can be perceived only if two conditions are met: (a) Segmentation forms a partition of the sequence (i.e., subdivides the sequence into subsequences, called cells, that are disjoint and whose union is the sequence), and (b) the five-element string is one of the cells of the segmentation.
For guidance on how to think about the segmentation of long sequences, we turn to Gamer's (1974, Lecture 3) work on periodic sequences of auditory events. Consider the following sequence, which has a period of nine elements:
Gamer has shown that in such sequences, the preferred segmentation is one bracketed by the longest runs. In the example above, a repeating pattern is heard:
It starts with "X X" and ends with " 0 0 0 0 0."
We do not know how people would segment the aperiodic sequences that were generated in the present experiment. It is unlikely that the cells of the partition would be of fixed size. To the extent that subjects segmented the sequence at all, we expect that they used a rule akin to the one Gamer proposed for periodic sequences: They segment the sequence into short ( < l o elements) patterns that begin and end in relatively long runs. Thus, for instance, in the example given earlier, the sequence . . . GGGBBBGGGG . . . could be a cell of the segmentation, but the symmetric pattern printed in bold characters would not be. It would not be noticed, and therefore would not be avoided.
Furthermore, it is not likely that the segmentation of a sequence that is growing could affect the growth of the sequence. If a pattern requires both a perceived beginning and a perceived end to become a cell, then its symmetry can be perceived only after the leading edge of the sequence has passed it by, that is, after it is complete. At that point, it cannot be undone.
Thus, if the sequence is long, people will not notice symmetries. Subjects can do no more than control the numerical properties of subsequences when they apply the representativeness heuristic.
We are left with doubts regarding the status of the representativeness heuristic as a theory of judgment and choice. We are not convinced that it constrained our thinking beyond what had already been said about the perception and generation of randomness (by Gamer, for example). Although it is useful to have solid evidence on the relative importance of LSN features and pattern features, we should have known all along that pattern features would not play a major role. We may have taken the implications of the representativeness heuristic too seriously. There is no procedure for deducing just how representativeness will be implemented in a given context, such as the one studied here, and we perhaps should not have tried.
If we approach our subjects' behavior assuming that representativeness is the heuristic guiding their behavior, then we will say-as we have said abovethat not all aspects of representativeness manifested themselves in this task because not all of the relevant information was perceptible to the subjects. But perhaps we ought to interpret the data reported in this chapter as undermining the theory, for otherwise we are placing the notion of representativeness in an empirically invulnerable position, because it is unlikely that we will ever observe more directly whether subjects use a tacit heuristic when they judge and choose courses of action. Kahneman and Tversky's notions of heuristics, such as availability and representativeness, are not theories; they are at best frames for theories, to be filled with an account of how and why people do what they do in particular situations. The epistemological role of such theory frames has yet to be explicated.
